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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, academics and policymakers have shown great interest in 
intergenerational mobility – the strength of the association between individuals’ social origin 
and social destination. Economists have added much to this debate, particularly through their 
examinations of the link between the earnings (or incomes) of fathers and sons. However, due 
to data limitations, obtaining consistent estimates of earnings mobility remains a non-trivial 
task (Solon 1992; Black and Devereux 2011; Blanden 2013). The contribution of this paper is 
to present new evidence on the consistency of Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Squares 
(TSTSLS) estimates of earnings mobility; a methodology now widely applied in this 
literature (Appendix A reviews almost 30 papers where it has been used
1
). Indeed, TSTSLS 
has proven to be the only way to estimate earnings mobility in a number of countries, 
including Australia, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Japan, China and South Africa. Figure 
1 illustrates the particularly prominent role it has therefore played in cross-national 
comparisons; of the 20 countries included in Corak (2012), TSTSLS has been used in more 
than half (those with white bars).   
<< Figure 1 >> 
Yet, despite the important work of Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch 
(2008), more needs to be known about the consistency of TSTSLS estimates of earnings 
mobility. We therefore build upon the aforementioned authors’ work by extending their 
framework from the intergenerational elasticity (β) to the intergenerational correlation (ρ), 
quantifying the inconsistency of TSTSLS estimates when using a range of different 
instrumental (imputer) variables, and considering a potentially important (yet little discussed) 
measurement issue.  
The TSTSLS estimation procedure can be summarised as follows. Ideally, earnings 
mobility would be estimated via the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝛼 +  𝛽. 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 +  𝑢          (1) 
Where: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = (Log) permanent earnings of sons 
                                                          
1
 Appendixes A, B, C and D, cited in this working paper, are available upon request. 
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𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = (Log) permanent earnings of fathers 
Two different measures of earnings mobility would then typically be produced: the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity (𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆): 
𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
           (2) 
Where: 
𝜎𝑋,𝑌 = The covariance between father’s and son’s permanent earnings 
𝜎𝑋
2= The variance of father’s earnings 
and the intergenerational correlation (𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆): 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
=
 𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋.𝜎𝑌
         (3) 
Where: 
𝜎𝑋= The standard deviation of father’s earnings 
𝜎𝑌= The standard deviation of son’s earnings 
The measure of 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 preferred in the literature is a time-average of father’s annual earnings 
across several years (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺)
2
. However, in many countries, earnings data cannot be linked 
across generations – i.e. there is no dataset where both father’s and son’s earnings can be 
observed. The TSTSLS approach attempts to overcome this problem via imputation – 
predictions of father’s earnings are made based upon other observable characteristics (e.g. 
their occupation and education level). Equation 1 is then estimated using these predictions of 
father’s earnings (?̂?) instead of a measure that has been directly observed (e.g. 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺). This is 
often described as an instrumental variable technique in the earnings mobility literature (e.g. 
Lefranc and Trannoy 2005; Nuñez and Miranda 2011), though it can alternatively be viewed 
as a cold-deck imputation procedure (Nicoletti and Ermisch 2008) or a ‘generated regressor’ 
approach (Murphy and Topel 1985; Wooldridge 2002:115; Inoue and Solon 2010).  
                                                          
2
 Although five consecutive years of father’s earnings is often used (Solon 1992; Vogel 2008; Björklund and 
Chadwick 2003; Hussein et al 2008; Corak and Heisz 1999), more than ten may be needed if there is substantial 
auto-correlation in the transitory component of earnings over time (Björklund and Jäntti 2009; Mazumder 2005). 
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Solon (1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) consider 
the properties of TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational elasticity (𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). They show 
that consistent estimates can be obtained if either: 
 The instrumental (imputer) variables have no direct effect upon son’s earnings 
 The R2 of the equation used to predict father’s earnings equals one  
Yet, as father’s education and occupation are the instruments (imputer variables) usually 
available, it is widely recognised that neither of these conditions hold. (Father’s education 
and social class are likely to independently influence offspring’s earnings, while also not 
being perfect predictors of father’s permanent earnings). It is thus often stated that 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
will be upward inconsistent as a result
3
. 
 The key issue thus becomes the magnitude of this upward inconsistency. It is small 
enough to be safely ignored, or is it so large that TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility 
become problematic? Likewise, if more detail is added to the model predicting father’s 
earnings, does this significantly reduce the upward inconsistency? Unfortunately, little is 
currently known about these important issues. Indeed, the only study to quantify the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is Björklund and Jäntti (1997). For one particular imputation model, 
containing a specific set of predictor variables, they find upward inconsistency of around 30 
percent. 
 We contribute to this evidence base in multiple ways. First, the framework of 
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) is extended from the 
intergenerational elasticity to the intergenerational correlation ( 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ). We use this to 
explain why 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is downward inconsistent in our empirical analysis (i.e. in the opposite 
direction of the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ). Second, new evidence is provided on the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 using a range of different imputer variables, and thus 
the extent to which this problem can be reduced through using a more detailed first-stage 
prediction model. Third, we divide 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 into components to demonstrate what 
is driving their inconsistency, and show how this changes when different prediction models 
are used. It is also hoped that this will resolve some confusion in the applied literature, where 
it is often stated that the goal is to ‘choose the instruments in order for the R2 of the [father’s 
                                                          
3
 The following section will present a framework which illustrates why this is the case. 
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earnings prediction] regression to be as high as possible’ (Cervini-Pla 2012:9)4. Finally, we 
note how most studies make predictions of father’s current earnings (𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ), whereas 
permanent earnings (𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) is the actual unobserved variable of interest. We argue that, in 
this situation, more general expressions for the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  are 
needed. Our empirical analysis then illustrates how conventional wisdom (e.g. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
always being upward inconsistent) no longer holds.  
The paper now proceeds as follows. Properties of TSTSLS earnings mobility estimates 
are reviewed in section 2. This is followed by an overview of the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) dataset and our empirical methodology in section 3. Results are presented 
in section 4, and conclusions in section 5. 
2. TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility  
Our starting point is the framework of Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008). As noted in the 
introduction, the model of interest is: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽. 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝜇         (4) 
Where: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = Log son’s permanent earnings 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = Log father’s permanent earnings 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is unobserved in the ‘main’ dataset, but it does contain additional characteristics (Z), 
such as father’s education and occupation, likely to be associated with 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒.  
 Now say a second ‘auxiliary’ sample (i) contains a measure of respondents’ 
permanent earnings
5
 (ii) is drawn from the same population and (iii) contains the same Z 
variables. The following OLS regression model can be estimated: 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝛿. 𝑍 + 𝑣           (5) 
Where: 
                                                          
4
 In our empirical analysis we show that adding variables to increase the first-stage R
2
 can actually increase the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.  
5
 Time-average earnings would be the preferred measure within the auxiliary dataset. Unfortunately, this is 
rarely available, and so current earnings are often used as the ‘first-stage’ dependent variable instead. We 
illustrate how this influences TSTSLS estimates in section 4. 
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Z = The instrumental (imputer) variables 
And then used to predict log permanent father’s earnings: 
?̂? =  ?̂?. 𝑍            (6) 
Where: 
?̂? = Predicted log father’s permanent earnings 
𝛿= Estimated regression coefficients from the first-stage prediction model 
Hence (7) can now be estimated rather than (1): 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽. ?̂? + 𝑢           (7) 
Estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 then follow from equations 2 and 3 (substituting ?̂? for 𝑋). 
The two most commonly used Z variables are father’s education and occupation (see 
Appendix A). However, both are likely to directly influence son’s earnings (i.e. they are 
likely to be endogenous)
6
. Consequently, son’s log earnings will actually be given by: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝜆1. 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝜆2. ?̂? + 𝑢        (8) 
With 𝜆1 being the direct impact of the father’s actual permanent earnings on son’s earnings 
and 𝜆2 the effect of father’s predicted earnings on son’s earnings. (From this point forward, 
we drop the ‘True’ subscript for notational convenience). Solon (1992) and Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997) show that 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 thus converges in probability to:    
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  𝜆1 + 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜂.𝜎𝑋
  
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. 𝜎?̂?.
(1−𝜂2)
𝜂.𝜎𝑋
          (9) 
Where: 
𝜎?̂? = The standard deviation of father’s predicted earnings 
                                                          
6
 One way to think about this is that father’s education and social class influences their children’s labour market 
outcomes, over and above the impact the greater earnings that highly educated, professional father’s generate.  
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𝜎𝑋= The standard deviation of father’s actual long-run earnings 
With: 
𝜂 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑋
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
  
Where: 
𝜎?̂?,𝑋= The covariance between predicted and actual log father’s earnings 
Under the assumption that the covariance between predicted and actual log father’s earnings 
is equal to the covariance between predicted father’s earnings and itself: 
𝜎?̂?,𝑋 = 𝜎?̂?,?̂?                     (10) 
𝜂 becomes7: 
𝜂 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑋
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
=
𝜎?̂?,?̂?
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
 =
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
=  
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑋
= 𝑅             (11) 
Where: 
R = The square root of the variance explained (R
2
) in the first-stage prediction model (i.e. of 
equation 5). 
The probability limit of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 then becomes: 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. 𝜎?̂?.
(1−
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎𝑋
2)
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑋
.𝜎𝑋
 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. 𝜎?̂?.
(1−
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎𝑋
2)
𝜎?̂?.
 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. (1 −
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎𝑋2
) 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. (1 − 𝑅
2)               (12) 
                                                          
7
 The covariance between a variable and itself is equal to the variance of that variable. Hence 𝜎?̂?,?̂?becomes 𝜎?̂?
2. 
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With the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 therefore: 
 𝜆2. (1 − 𝑅
2)                    (13) 
There are a number of important points to note about (11), (12) and (13). First, as 0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1, 
the variance of father’s predicted earnings must be less than or equal to the variance of actual 
father’s earnings: 
0 < 𝜎?̂?
2 ≤  𝜎𝑋
2  
Second, if the variance of father’s predicted earnings (𝜎?̂?
2) were equal to the variance of 
father’s actual earnings (𝜎𝑋
2), then R
2
=1 and the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 reduces to zero. 
Hence, in this framework, the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is driven by incorrect estimation of 
the variability in father’s predicted earnings. Third, if the Z variables are indeed exogenous 
with respect to son’s earnings, then 𝜆2  equals 0, and 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  is consistent. However, if 
parental education and occupation are the Z chosen, 𝜆2  will almost certainly be positive 
(𝜆2>0)
8
. Thus, under the reasonable assumption that 𝜆2>0, and given R
2
 ≤ 1, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 will be 
upwardly inconsistent. Fourth, if everything else remains unchanged, the magnitude of this 
upward inconsistency will decrease as the variance explained in the first-stage prediction 
equation increases. Or, to put this another way, the upward inconsistency will decrease as the 
variance of father’s predicted earnings tends towards the variance of father’s actual earnings 
(𝜎?̂?
2  →  𝜎𝑋
2). Fifth, it is important to recognise, however, that including additional variables 
to increase the R
2
 of the first-stage prediction equation may simultaneously influence 𝜆2. 
Consequently, adding a particularly endogenous Z variable could increase 𝜆2  to such an 
extent that it more than offsets the benefits of any change to the first-stage R
2
. Whether 
adding variables to the prediction equation reduces the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is therefore 
an (underexplored) empirical issue, representing a gap in the literature this paper attempts to 
fill. 
 Next, we extend the framework of Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and 
Ermisch (2008) to the intergenerational correlation (𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). If one could observe 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 and 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒, ρ would simply be: 
                                                          
8 In other words, offspring with more educated parents from higher social classes are likely to earn more than 
offspring from less advantaged backgrounds, even after father’s actual long-run earnings have been taken into 
account. 
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𝜌 = 𝛽.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
                                (14) 
Replacing 𝜎𝑋 with 𝜎?̂?, and β with 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 converges in probability to: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 .
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
  
  = [𝛽 + 𝜆2. (1 − 𝑅
2)]. 
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
 
  = [𝛽.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
+ 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)]                            (15) 
The inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is then given by (15) – (14): 
[𝛽.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
+ 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)] - 𝛽.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
 
=  𝛽. [
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
−
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
] + 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)                 (16) 
Now define A as the left-hand side of (16) and B as the right-hand side: 
𝐴 =  𝛽. [
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
−
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
]                     (17) 
𝐵 = 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)               (18) 
Under the previously stated assumption that 𝜎?̂?
2 ≤ 𝜎𝑋
2, then A ≤ 0 (i.e. this will lead to 
downward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). In contrast, assuming that 𝜆2>0 then, as R
2
 ≤ 1, B ≥ 0 
(i.e. this will lead to upward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). Therefore, unlike 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, one does 
not know the direction of the inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. Rather, it depends upon the relative 
magnitudes of A and B. This is again an empirical issue, which we provide the first evidence 
upon in our analysis. 
 The derivations presented above have all relied upon the following assumptions:  
 The main and auxiliary datasets are random samples from the same population 
 The Z variables are independent and identically distributed across the two datasets 
 That 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is the first-stage dependent variable, and it is this quantity that we wish to 
impute into the main dataset. 
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To meet these assumptions, it would be ideal for the main and auxiliary datasets to be 
identical (with the exception, of course, that the former does not include 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 ). In this 
situation, the consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is driven solely by the choice of imputer 
variables (Z) as set out above.  
 In reality, these assumptions may not be met. For instance, Björklund and Jäntti 
(1997) note it is common for respondents to report their own education and occupation (Z) in 
the auxiliary dataset, but for offspring’s proxy reports of their father’s characteristics to be 
available in the main dataset. The impact this has upon the consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 will depend upon the nature and extent of this measurement error. We therefore also 
consider this issue in our empirical analysis. 
Moreover, there is the additional complication of how father’s earnings are measured 
in the auxiliary dataset. Returning to equation (5), it has thus far been implicitly assumed that 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 (permanent father’s earnings) is available within the auxiliary dataset.  Yet, in practise, 
this is almost never the case. Rather, researchers typically have access to data for a cross-
section of adults whose earnings are recorded for one particular year (𝑋𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐸). A common 
choice is a labour force survey, for example. Therefore the prediction model is often specified 
as (19) rather than (5): 
𝑋𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐸 = 𝛿. 𝑍 + 𝛾. 𝐴 + 𝑣                              (19) 
where: 
𝑋𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐸 = Earnings in a single year for a cross-section of adults 
𝑍 = The imputation variables 
A = Age group dummy variables 
Estimates from (19) are then used to generate predictions of father’s earnings in the main 
dataset instead of equation (6), with age set to around 40 (as the approximate point when 
annual earnings reach their peak): 
?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 =  ?̂?. 𝑍 + 𝛾. 𝐴𝑔𝑒40                             (20) 
Yet little is known about the consistency of TSTSLS estimates in such situations, where the 
first-stage dependent variable (𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ) differs from the unobserved construct of interest 
10
 
  
(𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). Indeed, this issue was not explicitly considered by Björklund and Jäntti (1997) or 
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008), and should not be assumed to be an innocuous change to the 
framework presented above. 
We illustrate this point with an example. First, suppose that 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 is contained within 
the auxiliary dataset, along with a sufficiently rich set of Z so that the first-stage R
2
 equals 
one. Consequently, ?̂?  will be identical to 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 , thus resulting in consistent estimates of 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  (e.g. recall equation 13). Now consider the same scenario, but where 
𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  is the first-stage dependent variable. A first-stage R
2
 of one would imply that 
?̂? =  𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 , resulting in rather different estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  (i.e. it is well 
established in the literature that 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ≠ 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). Specifically, the use of 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 would lead 
to downwardly inconsistent estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 . This highlights how the 
corollaries presented within the framework above (e.g. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  always being upward 
inconsistent) do not necessarily hold when the first-stage variable being imputed (𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒) 
differs from the construct actually of interest (𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). 
 More general expressions for the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 are therefore 
required, which hold whether either 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  or 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒  are used as the first-stage dependent 
variable. First, consistent estimates of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 from equation (1) converge in probability to: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
                      (21) 
Under TSTSLS, as X is unavailable, ?̂? enters in its place: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?
2                             (22) 
The inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is now given by (22) minus (21): 
𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?
2 −  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
                                (23) 
Note that, in this more general framework, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  can be either upwards or downwards 
inconsistent. Indeed, the direction and magnitude of the inconsistency depends upon one’s 
ability to correctly estimate the ratio of the covariance between father’s and son’s earnings 
(𝜎𝑋,𝑌) to the variance of father’s earnings (𝜎𝑋
2). 
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 Equations (24) to (26) provide analogous expressions for 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.  If 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 and 𝑌𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
were available in the main dataset, ρ could be consistently estimated by: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜌 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
=
 𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋.𝜎𝑌
                            (24) 
Replacing, 𝑋 with ?̂?, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 converges in probability to: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?
2 .
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
=
 𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑌
                       (25) 
with the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 now given by (25) minus (24): 
 𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑌
 - 
 𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋.𝜎𝑌
                                   (26) 
In our empirical analysis we illustrate how the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 can vary 
substantially depending on whether 𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑔 (as a measure of 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) or 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  is used as the 
first-stage dependent variable.  
To conclude, we note that generated regressors (e.g. ?̂?) are also subject to sampling 
variation. Consequently, second stage standard errors will be underestimated unless this 
additional uncertainty is taken into account. Murphy and Topel (1985), Wooldridge (2002) 
and Inoue and Solon (2010) provide formulae to make an appropriate adjustment to the 
estimated standard errors, while Björklund and Jäntti (1997), Inoue and Solon (2010) and 
Piraino (2014) suggest bootstrapping as a viable (if computer intensive) alternative. We do 
not dwell on this issue in this paper, and focus upon the inconsistency of TSTSLS point 
estimates. Nevertheless, this additional source of sampling uncertainty should always be 
taken into account when applying such generated regressor techniques
9
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In our empirical application, we report bootstrapped standard errors. However, as our auxiliary dataset is set to 
contain 500,000 observations, sampling uncertainty in our generated regressor(s) is only a minor issue. 
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3. Data 
The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a nationally representative sample of US 
households. It began in 1968, with annual follow-ups to 1997, and bi-annual interviews 
thereafter. Detailed information has been collected at each sweep from the household head 
and their partner. Offspring are tracked as they leave the initially sampled household. 
Consequently, the PSID contains earnings information across multiple years for both fathers 
and sons. Throughout our analysis we restrict the sample to include sons who were household 
heads aged between 30 and 60 in 2011, and who reported their earnings for the previous year. 
Moreover, we only include sons whose father can be identified, has reported annual earnings 
on at least five occasions during their prime working years (between ages 30 and 60), and 
where both parent and offspring reports of father’s education, occupation and industry are 
available.  
After making these restrictions, our working sample equals 1,024 observations. Table 
1 illustrates that approximately 80 percent of these individuals have at least 15 reports of 
father’s annual earnings available, with 60 percent having 20 or more. A ‘permanent’ 
measure of father’s earnings is created by averaging across all available reports for each 
sample member. We call this 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺, the closest measure to 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 available in the PSID. All 
earnings data have been adjusted to 2010 prices.  
     << Table 1 >> 
 As part of each PSID sweep, fathers were asked detailed questions about their 
educational attainment, occupation and industry (we label father’s reports of these variables 
as 𝑍𝐹𝐴). Education has been recorded using the highest grade ever completed, which we have 
converted into eight groups (see Table 2). Occupation and industry have been recorded using 
three digit census codes. These are finely defined categories – separating occupations and 
industries into approximately 200 groups. We use this detailed information on father’s 
occupation and industry (taken from the year their offspring turned age 15
10
) as the key 
imputer variables (Z). At times, we also use more broadly defined ‘1 digit’ occupation and 
industry groups (as presented in Table 2). 
<< Table 2 >> 
                                                          
10
 Thus the occupation and industry of the average father included in the sample was taken from the 1983 PSID 
wave, where they were (on average) approximately 40 years old. 
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Sons also reported similar information about their father’s education, occupation and industry 
(denoted 𝑍𝐶𝐻). For instance, in the 2011 sweep, sons were asked: 
How much education did your father complete? 
What was your father’s usual occupation when you were growing up? 
What kind of business or industry was that in? 
Information on Z is thus available both directly from fathers (𝑍𝐹𝐴) and indirectly via their 
sons (𝑍𝐶𝐻). We exploit this in the following section to examine the robustness of TSTSLS 
mobility estimates to who reports the Z characteristics.     
Creating an auxiliary dataset 
The 1,024 PSID observations described above form our ‘main’ dataset (PSID-MAIN). To 
create an auxiliary dataset, we sample with replacement from these individuals. This 
generates an auxiliary sample containing 500,000 observations. (Henceforth PSID-AUX). 
The intuition behind this approach is similar to creating a single bootstrap re-sample
11
. 
Specifically, by randomly re-sampling from PSID-MAIN, we create a second random draw 
of individuals who belong to the same population
12
. This approach has three important 
advantages. First, one can guarantee that the main and auxiliary datasets are drawn from the 
same population. Second, the main and auxiliary datasets contain exactly the same variables 
measured in exactly the same way. Third, the size of the auxiliary dataset is under our 
control. 
We exploit these advantages to produce TSTSLS mobility estimates under ‘ideal 
conditions’ (i.e. large auxiliary dataset, identical measurement of key variables across 
datasets, samples drawn from the same population). This enables us to investigate the 
consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 under different choices of the Z (imputer) variables. We 
then add additional complicating factors into the analysis (e.g. measurement of Z differing 
across datasets) to investigate the robustness of TSTSLS estimates to other challenges 
researchers face.  
Methodology 
                                                          
11
 Indeed, if we were to create an auxiliary dataset of size 1,024, then this would be equivalent to us taking a 
single bootstrap re-sample. 
12
 A random number seed has been set to ensure results are replicable. We have experimented with different 
random number seeds and found little substantive change to our results. 
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PSID-AUX is used to impute father’s earnings (?̂?) into PSID-MAIN following the TSTSLS 
approach. The twist, of course, is that PSID-MAIN also contains an actual observed measure 
of father’s long-run earnings (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺). One can therefore investigate how intergenerational 
mobility estimates change when using ?̂? to measure father’s earnings rather than 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺. 
The first-stage prediction model, estimated using PSID-AUX, takes the form:   
𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 =  𝛼 + 𝛾. 𝑍𝐹𝐴 + 𝑢                   (27) 
𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺= Father’s observed time-average earnings  
𝑍𝐹𝐴= Father’s reports of the imputer variables  
The key decision is then which variables to include in 𝑍𝐹𝐴. Appendix A provides an 
overview of those typically used in the literature. There are four common choices: 
(i) broad education level - e.g. Dunn (2007) 
(ii) broad education and broad occupation - e.g. Björklund and Jäntti (1997) 
(iii) broad education, occupation and industry - e.g. Piraino (2007) 
(iv) broad education and detailed (3 digit) occupation - e.g. Leigh (2007) 
This guides the combination of Z used in this paper. Table 3 illustrates the variables we 
include in five different first-stage model specifications (henceforth M1 to M5).  
<< Table 3 >> 
Parameter estimates from these first-stage models are presented in Appendix B. These are 
used to impute father’s earnings (?̂?) into PSID-MAIN: 
?̂? =  ?̂? +  𝛾. 𝑍𝐹𝐴                     (28) 
The following regression model is then estimated six times within PSID-MAIN - once 
using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 to measure father’s earnings and five times using the different predictions of ?̂?:  
𝑌2010 =  𝛼 +  𝛽. 𝑋 +  𝜀                     (29) 
Where: 
𝑌2010 = Log annual earnings of sons in 2010 
X = Father’s earnings (measured using either 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 or ?̂?) 
15
 
  
We then compare estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  (obtained using ?̂? ) to 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 
(obtained using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺).  
In our main analysis, son’s earnings (Y) are taken from a single year (2010), when they 
are aged between 30 and 60. Ideally, to minimize the impact of life-cycle bias, a tighter age 
restriction would have been used (e.g. 35 to 45 year old sons only)
13
. Unfortunately, making 
such a restriction here would result in a significant reduction in sample size. We nevertheless 
appreciate the importance of this issue, and have hence investigated the sensitivity of our 
results to (a) restricting the sample of sons to 35 to 45 year olds only (b) using a five-year 
average of son’s earnings. Although there is some evidence of lifecycle bias in our estimates, 
conclusions regarding the consistency of  𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 remain largely unchanged. (All 
estimates available from the authors upon request). 
4. Results 
This section presents results from our empirical analysis of the PSID. Sub-section 4.1 focuses 
upon the choice of the instrumental (imputer) variables. Sub-section 4.2 turns to the issue of 
who reports the information on these Z characteristics (fathers or their sons). Finally, sub-
section 4.3 considers the impact of how earnings are measured within the auxiliary dataset. 
4.1 The choice of instrumental (imputer) variables 
Table 4 compares estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 to 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆. Whereas 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 stands at 
0.568
14
, TSTSLS estimate M1 equals 0.753, M2 equals 0.767 and M3 0.717. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is thus 
upward inconsistent by approximately 30 percent. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 declines under M4 and M5 (≈0.65) 
though the upward inconsistency remains non-trivial (15 percent).  
<<Table 4>> 
To provide further insight into these results, Table 5 panel A presents the components 
of the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 , corresponding to equations (9) to (12) in section 2. For 
                                                          
13 Bohlmark and Lindquist (2006) suggest that lifecycle bias is approximately zero when sons are age 38 in the 
United States. 
14
 Using a five-year average of father’s earnings, Solon (1992) and Björklund and Jäntti (1997) estimate 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 to 
be approximately 0.40. However, Mazumder (2005) argues that a five-year average of father’s earnings may be 
insufficient to eliminate problems of measurement error and transitory fluctuations. These estimates may 
therefore be downward inconsistent. Indeed, Mazumder obtains substantially higher values of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 (0.61) when 
averaging father’s earnings over 16 years. The fact that we obtain a higher estimate of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 (0.56) than Solon 
and Björklund and Jäntti is therefore likely to be due to father’s earnings having been averaged over more than 
20 years (see Table 1). 
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example, why is the upward inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  not reduced between M1 and M2, 
despite the notable increase in the first-stage R
2
? Table 5 illustrates that the addition of 
father’s occupation (M2) also influences the direct effect of predicted father’s earnings on 
son’s earnings (𝜆2); it increases from 0.30 to 0.36 as the R
2
 moves from 0.38 to 0.45. In terms 
of consistency, losses due to the former are not offset by gains from the latter. Consequently, 
the upward inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  increases from 0.185 to 0.199. This illustrates how 
simply choosing ‘the instruments in order for the R2 of the [first-stage] regression be as high 
as possible’ (Cervini-Pla 2012:9) will not necessarily reduce the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. 
Indeed, the addition of variables which influence 𝜆2 as well as the first-stage R
2
 can actually 
do more harm than good.   
Table 5 Panel A also reveals that two factors drive the big reduction in the 
inconsistency between M3 and M4. The first is the large increase in the standard deviation of 
father’s predicted earnings (𝜎?̂?) from 0.385 to 0.449. This, via equation (11), substantially 
increases the first-stage R
2
. The second is the decrease in 𝜆2, which falls from 0.29 to 0.21. 
Why is there then no further reduction of the inconsistency between M4 and M5? Table 5 
reveals that although 𝜎?̂? (and thus R
2
) increase, 𝜆2 returns back to its level under M3 (0.29). 
The effect of the former cancels out the latter, meaning no net gain regarding the consistency 
of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.   
<<Table 5>> 
Returning to Table 4, 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆  equals is 0.316. The TSTSLS M1 estimate is 0.259; 
downward inconsistency of approximately 18 percent. However 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  increases as 
additional 𝑍𝐹𝐴 variables are added to the prediction model, with the downward inconsistency 
standing at 12 percent using M3 (𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 0.277), and essentially zero using M5 (𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 
0.307). The inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 therefore tends to be (a) in the opposite direction (b) 
smaller in magnitude and (c) less sensitive to the combination of the Z variables than the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. Indeed, Table 4 illustrates how 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is not usually too far from 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆. This is important given that, of the 28 studies applying TSTSLS reviewed in Appendix 
A, only Björklund and Jäntti (1997) report the intergenerational correlation.  
 Table 5 Panel B splits the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  into two components: part A 
(corresponding to equation 17) and part B (corresponding to equation 18). Recall how the 
former induces downward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 , while the latter leads to upward 
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inconsistency. It becomes clear that the comparatively small inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
(relative to the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆) is due to these two components partially cancelling 
one another out. However, the downward pressure induced by part A is always slightly 
greater than the upward pressure from part B, leading to the overall downward inconsistency 
of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.  
 What happens as additional variables are added to the prediction model? First, the 
downward pressure induced by part A is always reduced. This is because the standard 
deviation of father’s predicted earnings (𝜎?̂?) is the only term within equation A that changes 
(see equation 17), and can only increase towards the ‘true’ value (𝜎𝑋) as variables are added 
to the prediction model. In contrast, part B includes (
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
) and (1 – R2)15, with a greater value 
of 𝜎?̂?  increasing the former but decreasing the latter. Moreover, 𝜆2  is also found in 
component B, which fluctuates in value between M1 and M5. Thus, whereas adding 
information to the prediction model clearly reduces the inconsistency induced by part A, the 
influence on part B is hard to predict. Our empirical analysis does suggest, however, that 
gains from the former more than offset any losses from the latter. Consequently, the 
inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 does generally decline when information is added to the first-stage 
prediction model. 
 To conclude this sub-section, we present estimates of rank order mobility (i.e. father’s 
and son’s relative position in the earnings distribution). Figure 2 provides a selection of 
findings from estimated transition matrices. (See Appendix C for full results). The top set of 
bars illustrate the percent of sons in each earnings quartile given that their father is in the top 
earnings quartile. The bottom set of bars presents analogous results for the sons of fathers in 
the bottom earnings quartile. Interestingly, TSTSLS estimates compare relatively well. For 
instance, using time-average father’s earnings, 40 percent of sons with fathers in the bottom 
earnings quartile remain in the bottom quartile (white segment of the bottom set of bars), 
while just 11 percent rise to the top quartile (black segment bottom set of bars). The TSTSLS 
estimates produce very similar results – even when the imputation model is relatively sparse 
(e.g. 38 percent and 10 percent respectively using prediction model M1). Moreover, although 
there is slight underestimation of the probability that sons of high earning fathers will remain 
in the top quartile (black segments in the top set of bars), there nevertheless remains a high 
degree of consistency between the TSTSLS and time-average results. In additional analyses 
                                                          
15
 See equation (11) for the relationship between 𝜎?̂? and R.  
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(available upon request) we follow Chetty et al (2014) and Gregg, MacMillian and Vittori 
(2014) and produce rank-rank mobility estimates using TSTSLS. Key findings are very 
similar to those for the transition matrices presented above. 
<< Figure 2 >> 
 Why is this relevant to our discussion of  𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ? It illustrates how 
TSTSLS captures rank order mobility (i.e. father’s and son’s position in the earnings 
distribution) remarkably well. It thus provides further evidence that the inconsistency of 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is largely being driven by scale miss-measurement (e.g. difficulties in 
accurately capturing the variance of father’s earnings) rather than fathers being placed in the 
wrong part of the earnings distribution. 
4.2 Measurement of imputer variables (Z) 
The above investigation took place under ‘ideal conditions’, with identical measurement of 
key variables across main and auxiliary datasets. We now investigate the impact of the 
imputer variables being measured using son’s recall of their father’s characteristics (𝑍𝐶𝐻) in 
the main dataset, while individuals own reports are used within the auxiliary dataset (𝑍𝐹𝐴).  
   First, we investigate the uniformity of parent (𝑍𝐹𝐴) and offspring (𝑍𝐶𝐻) reports of 
father’s education, occupation and industry. Appendix D provides full cross-tabulations, with 
summary results in Table 6. This includes the percentage of occasions where father’s and 
son’s report the same category (‘percentage correct’) and Kappa statistics of inter-rater 
reliability (a statistic which adjusts for agreement occurring by chance). Kappa statistics 
range from -1 (complete disagreement) to +1 (complete agreement) with Landis and Koch 
(1977) providing the following rules of thumb:  
 0-0.20 ‘Slight’ agreement (between parent and child reports) 
 0.21–0.40 ‘fair’ agreement 
 0.41–0.60 ‘moderate’ agreement 
 0.61–0.80 ‘substantial’ agreement 
 0.81–0.99 ‘almost perfect’ agreement 
<< Table 6 >> 
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Fathers and sons report the same education and industry on more than 60 percent of 
occasions. Kappa statistics (0.52 and 0.55) are towards the top end of Landis and Koch’s 
‘moderate’ agreement category, with ‘substantial agreement’ when weighted Kappa is used 
(0.72 and 0.67)
16
. In contrast, just 27 percent of father’s and son’s report the same category 
for father’s occupation, with Kappa statistics suggesting agreement is ‘slight’ (0.16) to ‘fair’ 
(0.28). One potential explanation is sons were asked about their father’s occupation at a 
vague time point (‘what was your father’s occupation when you were growing up?’) which 
we have compared to the job father’s reported holding when sons were age 15. Consequently, 
we are unable to establish whether this lack of agreement is due to son’s inability to 
accurately recall their father’s occupation, or different interpretation of the questions asked 
(e.g. son’s recalling their father’s occupation at a different age). 
Table 7 illustrates how switching to offspring reports of the imputer variables (𝑍𝐶𝐻) 
influences estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. Overall, this has relatively little impact upon our 
results. For instance, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  ( 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ) is estimated to be 0.767 (0.286) when using 
imputation model M2 and father’s reports (𝑍𝐹𝐴). This changes to 0.858 (0.291) when using 
son’s reports instead (𝑍𝐶𝐻 ). Similarly, under imputation model M5, estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
(𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆) stand at 0.642 (0.307) using father’s reports, and 0.662 (0.292) using son’s reports. 
Differences are therefore usually quite small, though on certain occasions are non-trivial. 
Nevertheless, our empirical analysis overall suggests that TSTSLS estimates are fairly robust 
to this particular measurement issue. 
4.3 Imputation of current versus time-average father’s earnings  
Does changing the first-stage dependent variable from 𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑔 to 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  influence 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 or 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆? Table 8 provides results, with 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 measured using father’s earnings in 1980 (or 
the closest available year)
17
.  
<< Table 8>> 
Key findings remain largely unaltered under M1, M2 and M3; large upward inconsistency in 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 remains, with slight downward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. However, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is now 
much smaller under M4 and M5. For instance, under M5 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 was 0.642 when using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 
                                                          
16
 See Table 6 notes for how weighted Kappa is defined. 
17
 Everything else is left unaltered. We have experimented with altering the year used to measure father’s 
occupation and industry and found little change to the results. Father’s reports of the imputer variables (𝑍𝐹𝐴) are 
used within both datasets. 
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(upward inconsistency of 15 percent). But, after changing the first-stage dependent variable 
to 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 falls to 0.415 (downward inconsistency of 25 percent). Similarly, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
using M5 is now 0.235 (downward inconsistency of 25 percent) having previously stood at 
0.307 (downward inconsistency of one percent). 
 Table 9 breaks these TSTSLS estimates down into their respective components 
(corresponding to equation 22 for 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and equation 25 for 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ). To begin, the 
covariance between father’s and son’s earnings (i.e. the common numerator of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆) is similar – although always marginally smaller – using 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. For instance, 𝜎?̂?,𝑦 
under M3 falls from 0.106 using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 to 0.098 using 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. Likewise, under M1, M2 and 
M3, the variance of predicted father’s earnings (𝜎?̂?
2) does not seem sensitive to the choice of 
the first-stage dependent variable (e.g. for M3, 𝜎?̂?
2  is 0.148 using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  and 0.145 using 
𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒). Consequently, none of the key components of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  or 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  are particularly 
influenced by the use of 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  rather than 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  when the first-stage prediction model is 
relatively sparse. Hence estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  are similar whichever earnings 
measure (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 or 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)  is used. 
<<Table 9>> 
The same does not hold true, however, under M4 and M5. Specifically, the variance 
of father’s earnings (𝜎?̂?
2) is significantly bigger when the first-stage dependent variable is 
𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. In contrast, the covariance between father’s predicted earnings and son’s earnings 
tends to be slightly smaller. Using M5 as an example, 𝜎?̂?
2 rises from 0.228 (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺) to 0.305 
(𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), while 𝜎?̂?,𝑦 falls from 0.146 (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺) to 0.127 (𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒).  Thus, while the denominator 
of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 (𝜎?̂?
2) has substantially increased (and is now almost identical to the denominator 
of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆) the numerator (𝜎?̂?,𝑦 ) has slightly decreased (and remains 26 percent below the 
numerator of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆). This causes 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 to become downwardly inconsistent. Whether one 
uses 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 or 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 as the first-stage dependent variable therefore seems to have much more 
influence upon the key components of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 when a detailed set of Z characteristics are 
included in the first-stage prediction model. 
Building upon the intuition above, the standard deviation of father’s predicted 
earnings (𝜎?̂?) also enters the denominator of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. The increase in 𝜎?̂? from using 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 as 
the first-stage dependent variable (as opposed to 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 ) therefore also puts downward 
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pressure on 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆18. Indeed, when using 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 actually moves further away from 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 as Z variables are added to the first-stage prediction model. For instance, the TSTSLS 
M2 estimate of ρ (0.271) is much closer to the OLS value (0.315) than the estimate obtained 
under M5 (0.230). In other words, the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  has increased in absolute 
magnitude, driven by the greater variability in father’s predicted earnings. This is in direct 
contrast to results using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 (presented on the left hand side of Table 9) where adding Z 
variables to the prediction model almost always brought 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 closer together (i.e. 
decreased the inconsistency). 
These results have important implications. First, changing the first-stage dependent 
variable can lead to rather different estimates of earnings mobility. Second, it is only safe to 
assume 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is upward inconsistent if 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is the first-stage dependent variable (i..e. the 
earnings measure being imputed into the main dataset). Third, this strengthens the empirical 
evidence that TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational correlation are typically downward 
inconsistent. Finally, even subtle changes to the imputation model can make important 
differences to 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.   
<< Table 8 >> 
5. Conclusions 
Intergenerational earnings mobility is a topic of great academic and policy concern. However, 
producing consistent estimates of earnings mobility is not a trivial task. In many countries 
earnings data cannot be linked across generations. Consequently, several studies estimate 
earnings mobility using TSTSLS instead. This paper has presented new evidence on the 
consistency of earnings mobility estimates based upon this methodology.  
 A summary of our results can be found in Table 10. This illustrates the sensitivity of 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 to using different first-stage imputation models and measurement of key 
variables. Column 1 indicates whether 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  (1980) or 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  (AVG) is the first-stage 
dependent variable. Column 2 indicates whether father’s (FA) or son’s (CH) reports of Z are 
used, while column 3 provides the specification of the prediction model (to be cross-
referenced with Table 3). Columns 4 and 5 provide estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, with 
shading illustrating the absolute degree of inconsistency. The following findings emerge: 
                                                          
18 The impact is less pronounced than for 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 due to the standard deviation of father’s predicted earnings 
being the key term rather than the variance. 
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 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is often (although not always) upwardly inconsistent.  
 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  is particularly sensitive to the choice and measurement of the first stage 
imputation model. Estimates are up to 50 percent upwardly inconsistent or 30 percent 
downwardly inconsistent.  
 Estimates of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 tend to be more stable and suffer less inconsistency. Of the 20 
estimates in Table 10, 14 lie within 20 percent of 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆, with five within ten percent.  
 Although the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  can in theory be in either direction, our 
empirical analysis suggests that, in practise, they tend to be below 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆.  
 
<< Table 10 >> 
Based upon our findings, we provide the following guidance to researchers wishing to 
estimate earnings mobility using TSTSLS. First, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 should both be reported 
where possible. But, if a choice has to be made, our empirical analysis suggests there may be 
reasons to prefer the former over the latter
19
. Second, the auxiliary and main datasets should 
contain information on educational attainment and detailed (3 digit) occupation as a 
minimum. This means that at least two first-stage specifications can be estimated – a ‘broad’ 
specification (as per our model M2 or M3) and a ‘detailed’ specification (as per our model 
M4 or M5). One can then investigate how this changes estimates of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, 
including a breakdown into their separate components (as per our Table 9). Third, the 
auxiliary dataset should ideally contain information on respondents’ time-average earnings 
(𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺). The use of cross-sectional data with respondents’ earnings reported at a single time-
point (e.g. a labour force survey) should be considered a second-best alternative. Fourth, as 
briefly discussed in section 2, standard errors should be corrected to account for the sampling 
variation in the predictions of father’s earnings. This can be done via a Murphy-Topel 
correction (Murphy and Topel 1985) or appropriate application of a bootstrap technique 
(Inoue and Solon 2010; Björklund and Jäntti 1997)
20
. Fifth, researchers should note that their 
estimates of earnings mobility may differ from other studies due to methodological rather 
than substantive reasons. This includes instances where TSTSLS has been used in rather 
different ways (e.g. different combinations, definitions and measurement of key variables). 
                                                          
19
 At the same time, it is important to recognise that ‘classical’ measurement error in son’s earnings will lead to 
inconsistent estimates of ρ but not β (Black and Devereux 2011). Counter-arguments can therefore be made as 
to why one may prefer β over ρ – hence our advice that both should be reported whenever possible. 
20
 Hardin (2002) and Hole (2006) illustrate how this can be implemented in Stata. 
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Finally, we urge great care to be taken when comparing mobility estimates across studies – 
and across countries - where different methodologies have been applied.  
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Table 1. Number of father’s earnings observations available 
Number of father’s 
earnings observations 
% 
Cumulative 
% 
6 1 1 
7 1 1 
8 1 3 
9 2 4 
10 1 6 
11 3 8 
12 2 11 
13 3 14 
14 3 17 
15 2 19 
16 4 23 
17 3 26 
18 4 30 
19 5 35 
20 6 41 
21 8 49 
22 7 56 
23 7 63 
24 6 70 
25 8 78 
26 7 84 
27 5 89 
28 5 94 
29 4 97 
30 3 100 
n  1,024 
 
Notes: Author calculations using the PSID dataset.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
 
  
Table 2. Education, broad (1 digit) occupation and broad (1 digit) industry categories 
Education Occupation Industry 
No education = 0 grades completed Professional  Agriculture 
Grades 1 to 5 Managers / senior administrators Mining 
Grades 6 to 8 Sales workers Construction 
Grades 9 to 12 Clerical Manufacturing 
High school = 12 grades Craftsman Transport and communication 
Some college = grades 13 to 15 Operatives Wholesale and retail 
College degree = grade 16 Transport Finance 
Advanced college degree = grade 17 Laborers Business services 
 
Farmers Personal services 
 
Service workers Entertainment 
  
Professional services 
    Public administration 
 
Notes: Refers to information on father’s education, broad occupation and broad industry available 
within the PSID.  
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Table 3. The imputer (Z) variables used in the first-stage prediction models 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Race √ √ √ √ √ 
Education √ √ √ √ √ 
Occupation (1 digit) - √ √ - - 
Occupation (3 digit) - - - √ √ 
Industry (1 digit) - - √ √ - 
Industry (3 digit) - - - - √ 
 
Notes: M1 to M5 refers to the five different specifications of the first stage prediction model. All 
variables refer to characteristics of PSID fathers. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity (β) and correlation (ρ) using 
different TSTSLS imputation models 
  
First-stage R
2
 
        Elasticity        Correlation 
TSTSLS 
model 
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 SE 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 SE 
M1 0.385 0.753 0.087 0.259 0.030 
M2 0.449 0.767 0.080 0.286 0.030 
M3 0.483 0.717 0.077 0.277 0.030 
M4 0.658 0.641 0.066 0.289 0.030 
M5 0.742 0.642 0.062 0.307 0.030 
OLS 
- 
0.568 0.053 0.316 0.029 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample restricted to the same 1,024 individuals 
across all specification. SE stands for standard error. M1 to M5 indicate which first-stage TSTSLS 
imputation model has been used (see Table 3). Estimates using observed time-average father’s 
earnings (OLS) reported in the bottom row. A full set of first-stage parameter estimates can be found 
in Appendix B. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the inconsistency of TSTSLS earnings mobility estimates 
(a) Elasticity 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
𝜆2 0.300 0.361 0.287 0.213 0.283 
𝜎?̂? 0.343 0.371 0.385 0.449 0.477 
𝜎𝑋   0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 
𝜎?̂?,𝑋 0.118 0.138 0.148 0.202 0.228 
R
2
 0.385 0.449 0.483 0.658 0.742 
𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 0.753 0.767 0.717 0.641 0.642 
Inconsistency 0.185 0.199 0.149 0.073 0.073 
 
(b) Correlation 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568 
𝜎?̂? 0.343 0.371 0.385 0.449 0.477 
𝜎𝑋   0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 
𝜎𝑌  0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Inconsistency part A -0.120 -0.105 -0.097 -0.060 -0.044 
𝜆2 0.300 0.361 0.287 0.213 0.283 
𝜎?̂? 0.343 0.371 0.385 0.449 0.477 
𝜎𝑌  0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
R
2
 0.385 0.449 0.483 0.658 0.742 
Inconsistency part B 0.064 0.075 0.058 0.033 0.035 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.316 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 0.259 0.286 0.277 0.289 0.307 
Inconsistency  -0.057 -0.030 -0.039 -0.027 -0.009 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. M1 to M5 refer to the TSTSLS imputation 
model specification used (see Table 3). See equation (11) and (12) for the components of the 
intergenerational elasticity and equations (16) to (18) for the components of the intergenerational 
correlation.  
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Table 6. The agreement between parent and offspring reports of father’s education, 
occupation and industry 
  Education 
Occupation 
(broad groups) 
Industry 
(broad groups) 
Percent agreement 62 27 61 
Kappa 0.52 0.16 0.55 
Weighted Kappa 0.72 0.28 0.67 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. See Appendix D for full cross-tabulations. The 
Kappa statistic is a measure of inter-rater reliability that adjusts for agreement occurring by chance. It 
ranges from -1 (complete disagreement) to +1 (complete agreement) with 0 indicating no agreement. 
Landis and Koch (1977) provide rules of thumb for interpreting levels of agreement using Kappa: 
0.01–0.20 ‘slight’, 0.21–0.40 ‘fair’, 0.41–0.60 ‘moderate’, 0.61–0.80 ‘substantial’, and 0.81–0.99 
‘almost perfect’. Weighted Kappa is where categories further apart (e.g. father reports high school and 
offspring reports bachelor degree) are considered to show greater levels of disagreement than 
categories closer together (e.g. father reports associates degree and offspring reports bachelor degree). 
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Table 7. TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational correlation and elasticity when 
son’s reports of father’s Z characteristics  
  𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
TSTSLS model 
Father’s reports 
(𝑍𝐹𝐴) 
Son’s reports 
(𝑍𝐶𝐻) 
Father’s reports 
(𝑍𝐹𝐴) 
Son’s reports 
(𝑍𝐶𝐻) 
M1 0.753 0.800 0.259 0.264 
M2 0.767 0.858 0.286 0.291 
M3 0.717 0.815 0.277 0.292 
M4 0.641 0.689 0.289 0.276 
M5 0.642 0.662 0.307 0.292 
OLS 0.568 0.316 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample restricted to the same 1,024 individuals 
across all specification. Table illustrates how 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 differ when using son’s reports 
(𝑍𝐶𝐻 ) of their father’s characteristics (e.g. education, occupation and industry) rather than using 
father’s own reports (𝑍𝐹𝐴). M1 to M5 refer to the specification of the TSTSLS imputation model used 
(see Table 3). Estimates using observed time-average father’s earnings (OLS) reported in the bottom 
row.   
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Table 8. Estimates of the intergenerational correlation and elasticity using different first 
stage dependent variables  
   𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
 
𝑿𝑨𝑽𝑮 𝑿𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 𝑿𝑨𝑽𝑮 𝑿𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 
M1 0.753 0.798 0.259 0.251 
M2 0.767 0.741 0.286 0.270 
M3 0.712 0.678 0.277 0.259 
M4 0.641 0.476 0.289 0.236 
M5 0.642 0.415 0.307 0.230 
OLS 0.568 0.316 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample restricted to the same 1,024 individuals 
across all specification.  𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 where time-average father’s earnings is the dependent variable in the 
first stage imputation model (i.e. ‘ideal conditions’). 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  where father’s 1980 earnings is the 
dependent variable in the first stage imputation model. M1 to M5 refer to the specification of the 
TSTSLS imputation model used (see Table 3). 
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Table 9. The numerator and denominator of 𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺  and 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 when ‘current’ 
earnings used as the first-stage dependent variable 
(a) Intergenerational elasticity 
 
First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 
  
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂?
𝟐
 
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂?
𝟐
 
  Value % Value % Value % Value % 
M1 0.753 0.089 -49 0.118 -62 0.798 0.078 -55 0.098 -68 
M2 0.767 0.106 -39 0.138 -55 0.741 0.098 -44 0.132 -57 
M3 0.717 0.106 -39 0.148 -52 0.678 0.098 -44 0.145 -53 
M4 0.641 0.129 -26 0.202 -34 0.476 0.116 -33 0.244 -20 
M5 0.642 0.146 -16 0.228 -26 0.415 0.127 -27 0.305 -1 
OLS 0.568 0.175 - 0.307 - 0.568 0.175 - 0.307 - 
 
(b) Intergenerational correlation  
 
First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 
  
  
𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂? 𝝈𝒚   
𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂? 𝝈𝒚 
  Value % Value %   Value % Value %   
M1 0.260 0.089 -49 0.343 -38 1.00 0.251 0.078 -55 0.312 -44 1.00 
M2 0.286 0.106 -39 0.371 -33 1.00 0.271 0.098 -44 0.364 -34 1.00 
M3 0.277 0.106 -39 0.385 -31 1.00 0.259 0.098 -44 0.381 -31 1.00 
M4 0.289 0.129 -26 0.449 -19 1.00 0.236 0.116 -33 0.494 -11 1.00 
M5 0.308 0.146 -16 0.477 -14 1.00 0.230 0.127 -27 0.553 0 1.00 
OLS 0.317 0.175 - 0.554 - 1.00 0.315 0.175 - 0.554 - 1.00 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. M1 to M5 refer to the TSTSLS imputation 
model specification used (see Table 3). 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 where time-average father’s earnings is the dependent 
variable in the first stage imputation model. 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 where father’s 1980 earnings is the dependent 
variable in the first stage imputation model.  ‘Value’ presents the value of the statistic in question. ‘%’ 
illustrates percentage underestimation relative to OLS results. 
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Table 10. A comparison of TSTSLS estimates using different measures of key variables 
and different imputation model specifications 
(1) 
First-stage 
dependent variable 
(2)         
Father / son 
reports of Z 
(3)     
Imputer 
variables (Z) 
(4)           
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
(5)                                                                                                       
𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
AVG CH M2 0.858 0.291 
AVG CH M3 0.815 0.292 
1980 CH M1 0.807 0.248 
1980 CH M2 0.806 0.259 
AVG CH M1 0.800 0.264 
1980 FA M1 0.798 0.250 
AVG FA M2 0.767 0.286 
AVG FA M1 0.752 0.259 
1980 FA M2 0.741 0.270 
1980 CH M3 0.731 0.263 
AVG FA M3 0.717 0.277 
AVG CH M4 0.689 0.276 
1980 FA M3 0.678 0.259 
AVG CH M5 0.662 0.292 
AVG FA M5 0.642 0.307 
AVG FA M4 0.641 0.289 
OLS benchmark 0.568 0.316 
1980 FA M4 0.476 0.236 
1980 CH M4 0.472 0.213 
1980 FA M5 0.415 0.230 
1980 CH  M5 0.349 0.183 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Auxiliary dataset sample size set to 500,000 
observations. ‘Imputer variables’ refers to the Z variables used to predict father’s earnings (see Table 
3). AVG / 1980 refers to the first-stage dependent variable (AVG = time-average; 1980 = single 
measure of father’s earnings in 1980). FA/CH indicates whether father’s or son’s reports of the Z 
characteristics used in the main dataset.  
  Absolute difference relative to time-average benchmark less than 10% 
  Difference relative to time-average benchmark 10% to 20% 
  Difference relative to time-average benchmark 20% to 30% 
  Difference relative to time-average benchmark 30% to 40% 
  Difference relative to time-average benchmark 40% to 50% 
  Difference relative to time-average benchmark >50% 
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Figure 1. An international comparison of intergenerational earnings mobility 
 
Notes: Estimates drawn from Corak (2012). New Zealand (NZ) data based upon a sample born in Dunedin and is not 
nationally representative. The colour of the bar indicates the estimation strategy used. Black bars indicate where OLS 
regression with time-average parental earnings has been used. White bars where the TSTSLS approach has been 
applied.  
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Figure 2. The estimated earnings quartile of sons, conditional upon their father being in the top 
(bottom) earnings quartile 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Top set of bars illustrates the percent of sons in each earnings 
quartile given that their father is in the top earnings quartile. Bottom set of bars present analogous estimates for sons 
whose fathers are in the bottom earnings quartile. ‘Time-average’ where father’s (observed) time-average earnings 
used to produce mobility estimates. TSTSLS estimates presented for imputation model specifications M1, M3 and M5 
(see Table 3 for further details). Full cross-tabulations are presented in Appendix C. 
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